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“In the first place”, Hannah Arendt wrote in 1943, “we don’t like to be 
called “refugees”.1  She had escaped Germany, survived the French internment 
camp in Gurs, and was living in the United States. For Arendt, “there is not and 
never was any club founded by Hitler-persecuted people whose name indicated 
that its members were refugees” (110). The concept of a refugee was already out 
of time: “We ourselves call each other “newcomers” or “immigrants”, she 
asserted. Arendt was writing before the adoption of the 1951 Refugee Convention 
definition of refugees as persons with a ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’. 
A fearful person in need of a state’s benevolence and protection was far from 
what Arendt had in mind when she reflected on the people who had lost homes, 
friends, occupations, and languages. Informed by her narrow sense of the 
political, a refugee was a person who sought refuge because of some act they had 
done or radical political opinion they held. They had acted in the world – a key 
feature of being political for Arendt. Their actions had exposed them to threats 
and dangers from which they had to flee and seek refuge. But the meaning of 
refugee was changing. People fleeing Europe during WWII were not ‘political’ in 
the sense Arendt valorized: “we committed no acts and most of us never dreamt 
of having any radical opinion”. The ‘refugee’ was becoming the person “so 
unfortunate as to arrive in a new country without means and have to be helped 
by Refugee Committees” (110).  
 
 Arendt’s defiance strikes a chord with me as I reflect on the response to 
what has been termed the “refugee crisis” in Europe today. But comparisons 
should be cautiously drawn. This mass movement of people is not new. People 
did not start fleeing Syria in the summer of 2015. They had been moving in large 
numbers since 2012, with millions in camps in Jordon, Lebanon, and Turkey. Nor 
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is Syria the only source, and Europe the only destination. The Mediterranean 
shores of Greece would appear to be the only sentient membrane of the 
European conscience.  
 
Many have compared the present movement of people through the 
Mediterranean to Jews fleeing Europe before and during WWII. That must 
involve the comparability of catastrophes, and a generalizable figuration of the 
refugee. I wish to address two issues this throws up - first, the problem of 
comparing ‘crises’ and ‘catastrophes’; and second, the figuration of the ‘refugee’. 
What does it mean to philosophise about ‘catastrophe’ – these events that people 
too readily think are comparable, one with another? What is the nature of 
equivalence asserted between different moments of mass movement of peoples?  
 
The world is almost permanently in the grip of ‘catastrophe’: refugee 
crises, climate change, nuclear disasters, and the possibility of total destruction.  
In his recent book After Fukushima: The Equivalence of Catastrophes, Jean-Luc 
Nancy asks what it means to philosophise after Fukushima.2 In this he echoes 
Adorno’s question, what does it mean to write poetry after Auschwitz? What 
Nancy is getting at is the question of the equivalence of catastrophe. There may 
be a strong proximity between philosophy and poetry, but there are differences 
between Auschwitz and Fukushima. Drawing on Marx’s thinking on money as 
‘general equivalence’, he remarks that we confront a global crisis of meaning, 
sense, or value that goes along with the problem of general equivalence. Even 
though there are immense differences between Auschwitz and Hiroshima, they 
are catastrophes that are often compared (despite their differences) for 
manifesting a ‘technological rationality’ expressly calculated for annihilation 
(10). Auschwitz and Hiroshima, both names, Nancy says, that mark the crossing 
of limits (not of morality, politics, or humanity) but of the very possibility of 
meaning. They are names “on the outermost margin of names, names that name 
only a kind of de-nomination – of defiguration, decomposition” (13).  These 
names must be heard with Paul Celan’s poem, Stretto, in mind:  
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The place, where they lay, it has  
a name – it has 
none. They didn’t lie there. Something 
lay between them. They didn’t see through it. (13)  
Can the proper names Auschwitz and Hiroshima be written together? A proper 
noun is a way to encounter something beyond signification. As Nancy explains: 
It signifies itself and nothing else. About the denomination that is that of 
these two names, we could say that instead of passing beyond, they fall 
below all signification. They signify an annihilation of meaning. (13) 
This is precisely why catastrophes are incommensurable.  Without access to 
meaning no comparison can be drawn. We are left only with the singularity of 
the proper name at the limits of language. 
 
Much continues to turn on the common noun, “refugee”. Debates seem to 
focus on whether people moving to Europe are ‘economic migrants’, people who 
want a better life, or ‘genuine refugees’? There is a blunt answer: ‘we are here 
because you were there’!3 ‘We are coming because you have not stopped 
meddling in our affairs’. Tony Blair has admitted his incompetence contributed 
to the rise of ISIS. Meddling in Mosul has an even longer history. David 
Cameron’s ‘swarm of people’ in Calais is empire redux. 
 
 The redundant refugee is a mirror image of Europe’s own redundancy. 
The problem of what it means to be European is already a question that is out of 
time. European ideologues are scrambling to hold on to core principles just as 
Europe’s constituent states are re-erecting borders and fences. There is an 
analogy to be drawn between Germany’s response to Greece (Grexit), and 
Hungary’s response to migrants. ‘Better you’re out than in’! A political act of 
defiance in both cases is to defy the gatekeeper and attempt to stay on your own 
terms. This need not mean that being part of a European polity or economy are 
the only options. For exile or debtor being in or out will not be a victory or defeat 
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that can be measured in the short term. What matters is that people struggle for 
an alternative.    
 
The status of ‘refugee’ will always be out of time by coming after the act of 
defiance that compels people to move to a better and safer life. One need not 
have radical opinions to seek refuge. To refuse internment at the borders of 
Europe; to want more for your children than charity; to risk everything by 
crossing seas and land borders – these are all political acts. The newcomer and 
the migrant are a constitutive force. They venture toward a future in which the 
label ‘refugee’ is always already redundant. It always comes too late. If the 
refugee is out of time and out of place, how might the condition of exile open 
political possibilities? 
 
 Edward Said addressed this question in his essay, “Reflections on Exile”, 
cautioning against romanticizing exile: 
Is it not true that the views of exile in literature and, moreover, in religion 
obscure what is truly horrendous: that exile is irremediably secular and 
unbearably historical; that it is produced by human beings; and that like 
death, but without death’s ultimate mercy, it has torn millions of people 
from the nourishment of tradition, family and geography?4 
And yet, pitching exile against nationalism in a dialectical struggle akin to Hegel’s 
master and servant, Said drew out the elements of solitude and loneliness of 
exile that may present an “alternative to the mass institutions that dominate 
modern life” (146). The moral imperative, as Adorno put it, is “not to be at home 
in one’s home” (147). Said embraced the sense that the only “home” that is truly 
available is in writing. This need not only be the exalted privilege of the 
intellectual, for inhabiting language and culture contrapuntally, is the experience 
of all exiles. 
 
Can the exile be housed in language? Reflecting on home, exile, and 
statelessness, Judith Butler in her book Parting Ways: Jewishness and the Critique 
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of Zionism considers the possibility of the poem as a home or homeland that puts 
an end to exile: 
One might wish the poem could become a home or homeland that puts an 
end to exile, but the poem is no place, its borders are not closed. It is in 
this sense utopic, opening out to a plurality that is called forth by the 
scene of its address.5   
Butler is reflecting here on a poem by the Palestinian poet Mahmood Darwish, 
“Who Am I, Without Exile?”. What, Darwish asks, would it mean to live in a time 
where there is no thought without exile? Darwish’s poem points to a liminal 
place without a road (no where to go, no direction), or home (no where to stay, 
dwell, be): 
 There is nothing left of me but you, and nothing left of you 
 but me, the stranger massaging his stranger’s thigh. 
 stranger! What will we do with what is left to us 
 of calm and of snooze between two myths? 
 And nothing carries us: not the road and not the house. 
Was this road always like this, from the start, 
or did our dreams find a mare on the hill 
among the Mongol horses and exchange us for it? 
And what will we do? 
What 
will we do 
without 
exile?6 
For Butler, “Exile is the name of separation, but alliance is found precisely there, 
not yet in a place, in a place that was and is and in the impossible place of the not 
yet, happening now” (224).  
 
For Darwish nothing carries us, ‘Not the road and not the house’. This 
non-place yields an important counter-point: this is not the road, this is not the 
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house. People who courageously crash through borders, scale walls, dig tunnels, 
and find new routes to their future know this. They recognize the difference 
between ‘no road, and no house’ on the one hand, and ‘this is not the road, and 
this is not the house’ on the other. Embrace the space this difference creates. 
That is the thought of exile. We can then embrace exile as a space of action and 
thought – that is, as the political par excellence. 
 
 Some years ago I encountered a stranger in Paris – that celebrated 
cosmopolitan city of exiles. A friend and I were making our way to the Palais de 
Justice for a function to mark the launch of the International Criminal Court. 
When we tried to hail a taxi, a modest unmarked car pulled up in front of us. We 
informed the driver of our destination and he offered to take us there for a price 
yet to be agreed. He spoke French and Tamil. I speak English, Sinhala, and not 
enough French to get by. It soon became clear that this man was a Tamil who had 
left Sri Lanka in circumstances very similar to my own. Despite feeling that I 
shared much in common with him, we did not share a language. But the joy our 
encounter brought me was immeasurable. I was on a road with a stranger but 
the ever-present sense of estrangement dissipated. This was the pleasure of exile 
– no illusion or dogma, just the simple sense that the only ‘home’ I wanted and 
needed that night was in that car with this man. 
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